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During the summer of 1981 a row between a Scottish local authori-
ty and the Scottish Secretary (Mr George Younger) assumed national im-
portance. Highly centralising measures to reduce local authority spend-
ing granted under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act 1981 were threatened and used against seven local 
authorities charged with "excessive and unreasonable expenditure". 
Of the seven, Lothian Regional Council was seen as the real test and 
throughout the summer of 1981 the Council argued that the proposed 
reduction of £53 million was unjustified, and took a defiant stand 
against the Secretary of State. The paper will emphasise some of the 
political difficulties that emerged from the Lothian affair in find-
ing a broadly acceptable solution to the problem of meeting the cost 
of providing local authority services. The symbolic nature of the 
change in centre-local relations will be demonstrated and the direc-
tion of change placed in context. 
Given this context one can argue that the Lothian dispute was 
the product of an over-reaction by George Younger. In an attempt to 
contribute to the reduction of the PBSR he decided to take selective 
powers against spendthrift authorities. He claimed to be protecting 
ratepayers and other authorities from the excesses of some left wing 
councils. David Heald argued that Younger had many powers but went 
much further(l)_ The Scottish Secretary was seen to be interfering 
in local authority affairs with minimal information. All but six 
authorities in Scotland were~ his guidelines. It was this latter 
point and criticism of his dubious comparability exercise that contri-
buted to his reduction of penalties. It was this climbdown from his 
f63 million proposed reductions, that applied when the seven rebel 
councils were first named, l:o £34 million of reduction, that really 
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emphasises his over-reaction, and because Scottish Office ministers 
are often closely related to local government issues, a realisation 
of the enormity of the damage done. 
Why then did George Younger proceed in this way? Primarily he 
was seen to be permitting local disobedience to central government 
directives. This was having a destabilising effect on his relations 
with Whitehall. Younger knew that the problem would not go away and 
he may have been fearful of the Scottish electorate. However what is 
clear is that Younger's legislation has soured centre-local relations. 
The origin of the dispute lies in the Election promises of the 
Conservatives in 1979. The Conservative Party was elected to reduce 
overall public expenditure and to abolish the rating system. The out-
come of the review of the rating system is still awaited but the 
limited action on the Layfield Report suggests the political sensi-
tivity of the question. Furthermore, as the Lothian dispute demon-
strates, the reduction of public expenditure particularly in the 
local government field has proved much more difficult, because of 
the nature and extent of the provision of services. 
A climate of suspicion exists in Scottish centre-local relations 
today, and I wish to argue that this was heightened by the Lothian 
dispute which was essentially political in origin and character. It 
was not an administrative dispute but an episode characterised by 
political brinkmanship and uncertainty. To explain the political 
mobilisation, the significance of the resistance, and the very lim-
ited political outcome, I have divided the account into four stages: 
first, George Younger's volte-face on the conventional understanding 
of the financial relationship that underlies local government activi-
ties; second some of the political questions raised by the 1981 
legislation; third, the emphasis Lothian Region's "Representations" 
placed on the distinctive contribution that service provision makes 
to local democracy; and fourth, the political outcome which by 
September could be construed as illustrating Lothian's political 
clumsiness and ultimate failure. 
I 
Reduction of local government expenditure is a prime target for 
Treasury hawks. Yet central government· only has had indirect control 
over this spending. Combined with the government's stated aims of re-
ducing central interference and reducing~ priori controls, the target 
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is not easy to hit. Mr Younger has been quite explicit about these 
aims, saying at the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities' Confer-
ence in 1980: 
"It should not be necessary to introduce in Scotland 
the same primitive powers being sought by Mr Heseltine 
to control local government". 
In October 1980 he re-emphasised this point: 
"It is not part of my wish to be drawn into running 
local authority affairs for them. This is not my role. 
If I was to interfere with the setting of rate levels 
I would remove the essential responsibility of the 
local councillors towards their ratepayers". 
Mr Younger did a complete volte-face with the passing of the 1981 
Act. The Secretary of State now has powers to intervene directly in 
the determination of annual spending and rate levels. Under Section 
13 of the new legislation the Secretary of State has power to reduce 
rate support grant when local authorities propose expenditure that 
the Secretary of State considers "unreasonable and excessive". Con-
sequently the responsibility to set spending levels remains with 
local authorities but in the knowledge that the Secretary of State 
could seek Parliamentary approval to cut rate support grant if they 
step outside his guidelines. Under already existing powers the Sec-
retary of State could already seek the approval of the House of Comm-
ons to penalise any council he considers to have spent the ratepayers' 
(and taxpayers') money excessively. But the penalty, until the Misc-
ellaneous Provisions legislation, could only be imposed retrospect-
ively. In other words Mr Younger had to wait until the money had 
actually been spent. Scottish local authorities, unlike England and 
Wales, are not permitted to levy a supplementary rate. Additionally 
an amendment to the legislation prevents a penalised authority from 
borrowing to cover the loss of rate support grant. Councils could 
also be forced, again by a reduction of the weekly paid support 
grant, to make a cut in rates during the financial year. Money "saved" 
from such action would either be returned to central government or a 
refund could be made to the ratepayers. 
Mr Younger defending the use of these powers said: 
"Somebody had to do something to protect ratepayers from 
a totally intolerable burden. The government had in-
hereted a totally unrealistic public expenditure pro-
gramme and were(~~w trying to get the runaway train 
under control". 
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Thus by crude legislative means of a sensitive political nature, 
central government has extended its control over local public expen-
diture in Scotland. Without taking over functions, there has been a 
further decisive development of central financial control over local 
affairs. Local authorities would either have to reduce expenditure to 
approved levels or resign, again an unprecedented state of affairs. 
The Scottish Office now has the statutory powers to prevent local 
authorities raising money for legitimate expenditures. The Govern-
ment are effectively determining the actual level of council spending 
in a way that has never been experienced before and this must be con-
sidered a serious infringement of local decision-making. Centre-
local relations have been drastically altered as a result of the 
government's economic policy, without apparently much thought given 
to the constitutional and political implications. 
What are some of the political characteristics of this legisla-
tion? Until the 1981 legislation, councils were allowed to choose 
whether they wanted to spend more or less than the Government's 
guidelines. The Scottish Secretary's view was that the 1981 legis-
lation was necessary because local authorities had not adhered to 
spending guidelines. The 1981 legislation removed the previous ele-
ment of choice and introduced some uncertainty. Unless the basic 
questions of how and by whom "excessive and unreasonable expenditure" 
is to be assessed, charges about the Secretary of State embarking 
upon a collision course, bullying and intimidating local authorities 
will remain. 
Midwinter in Conflict and Confusion: the Politics of Rates ar-
gued that the Scottish Office exercised choice about target authori-
ties based on only minimal information, namely, a monetary measure of 
expenditure per head of population of a comparable group of authori-
ties(3). He suggested that even the crudest statistics suggest that 
the authorities compared with Lothian are hardly comparable. He 
points to significant differences in area, population density, pop-
ulation and extent of urbanisation. As well as criticising this rather 
dubious methodology, Midwinter was critical of the financial criteria 
used. He argued that three factors influence rate levels: first in-
flation; second, the grant decisions ~f central government; and 
third, the impact of local policy choice. Using these criteria, 
Midwinter concluded that although Lothian recorded large rate in-
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creases only a small part of these result from actual service growth. 
The problem has been inadequate provision by central government for 
inflation in the cash limits. It is unfair, he argued, to use rate 
poundages as means of determining excessive and unreasonable expendi-
ture when the government's own decisions have been the major deter-
minant of rate increases. Accordingly, Midwinter suggests, in the 
selection of target authorities, Mr Younger used crude political 
judgement giving in to pressure not only from the businessmen and 
ratepayers who generally supported the Conservative Government, but 
also from within the Cabinet( 4 ). 
To meet the pressure from the Cabinet, hasty and expedient le-
gislation was prepared by the Scottish Office. Although the Scottish 
Secretary had many powers(S), he promoted legislation that tied the 
hands of local authorities in an attempt to reduce local public spend-
ing. Because of the necessity to demonstrate a willingness to reflect 
the Conservative Government's economic priorities, he decided to 
introduce penalties against local authorities for making ratepayers 
pay,to keep the services going at all costs. Over-reaction to this 
pressure by the Scottish Secretary is suggested by the fact that the 
Department of the Environment was not consulted. In fact it is sugg-
ested in Marsham Street that the first time they saw the Bill was 
after a clerk had been sent to buy it from the HMSO bookshop in 
High Holborn. A theme of a joint seminar, held in Oxford shortly 
after the publication of the Bill, between Scottish Office and Depart-
ment of the Environment officials on the new proposals was that the 
Scottish Office had used excessive legislative force. The practicali-
ties of the legislation and the political outcome were judged to be 
uncertain. Interest would therefore be focussed on the first use of 
the legislation and the exposure of the legislation to wider debate 
became critical. 
The first test of the legislation and the real battle of prin-
ciple was fought over the budget of Lothian Regional Council. Lothian, 
the second largest authority in Scotland, had planned expenditure 
nearly 25% above the Scottish Office guidelines. The Council was 
accused of "excessive and unreasonable spending", and Mr Younger 
ordered, in the course of the financial year 1981/2 a cut of £53 
million on a revenue programme of £319 million. The financial crisis 
had been deepening during the previous year with Mr Younger vetting 
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every item of Lothian's capital spending. But in an unprecedented step 
to control local authority expenditure, Mr Younger demanded to know: 
"whether the council proposed to make any reduction in 
the level of their planned spending for 1981-82 and 
whether they proposed to reduce the rates under the 
power contained in Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1981". (6) 
In reply, a remarkable and enthusiastic corporate exercise by Chief 
Officers in Lothian Region culminated with the publication of Lothian's
"Re resentations to the Secretar of State on the intention to reduce 
the Rate Support Grant". 
The response by Lothian Regional Council to the Scottish Secre-
tary charges the Scottish Office with being ill-informed about the 
expenditure appropriate to a particular authority and emphasises the 
importance of local democracy. Furthermore, the Representations sugg-
est that Lothian was being penalised because local social priorities, 
as seen by the council, did not correspond with central government's 
emphasis on monetarist policies. The Secretary of State never fully 
explained why a cut of £53 million was required. Lothian argued that 
the full weight of legislation was being threatened against them be-
cause central government's contribution to the provision of statutory 
services was diminishing, interest rates were high and the national 
economy was in recession. Moreover the Scottish Office imposed spend-
ing levels and demanded cuts that were arbitrary, not directly re-
lated to the services local authorities were expected, and, indeed, 
sometimes obliged by statute to provide. 
The cuts demanded in Lothian would be more than the running 
costs of a medium size Scottish regional authority. The Representa-
~ stated: 
"To expect the authority to reduce its expenditure within 
such a time scale reflects a dangerous lack of apprecia-
tion of the financial affairs of a large local authority". (Page 5) 
Furthermore: 
It 
"A reduction of the magnitude of £53 million would 
clearly impose intolerable and unacceptable damage on 
this authority, and a staffing cut of such an unpre-
cedented level would seriously jeopardize the coun-
cil's ability to provide its statutory services". (Page 6) 
was estimated that the Council, to.achieve the cuts demanded by 
Mr Younger, would require to reduce its staff by giving notice at 
August 1st 1981 to over 15,000 employees out of a total of 35,000 
employed. 
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The council had been elected in May 1978 to implement a pro-
gramme of well defined priorities- the extension of the caring co-
mmunity in the form of more social service provision; the strength-
ening of the local economic infrastructure, stressing the contribu-
tion of welfare investment in the broadest sense; and a "levelling-
up" of services inherited from the pre-reorganisation local authori-
ties to ensure that each part of the region benefitted from the best 
available provision. It was the cost of this transition programme 
and the associated policy of integrating services in a hostile eco-
nomic climate that Mr Younger and his advisers underestimated. 
The Representations provided the basis for Lothian's campaign. 
Mr Younger's legislation was seen to tie the hands of local authori-
ties, and promote administrative constraint, but above all politically 
motivated as all but six Scottish authorities were above his spend-
ing guidelines. Lothian successfully questioned Mr Younger's guide-
lines on "excessive and unreasonably expenditure" and the penalty 
was reduced from £53 million to £47 million as a result of theRe-
presentations. Lothian even managed to demonstrate that the Scottish 
Secretary had imposed the penalty, rather than the outcome being the 
product of agreement. The Scotsman echoed these sentiments on July 
4th, 1981: 
"Mr Younger, perhaps with some reluctance, is already 
well down the road which leads to central control and 
direction. By insisting that his spending guidelines to 
regional and district councils are sacrosanct he is 
claiming that only he and his officials can decide on 
the standard of local services and the priorities which 
must be observed in each area". 
Lothian's emphasis on the need for local accountability and the dis-
tinctive contribution of local authority services was to colour and 
heighten tension during the inevitable confrontation. 
On July 2nd Lothian Regional Council endorsed the Representations 
and called upon the Secretary of State to reconsider his proposal to 
reduce RSG by £53 million. Mr Younger promised swift action, and he 
reported to Parliament on July 21st that there should be imposed on 
Lothian Region a reduction in RSG because he was satisfied that the 
estimated expenditure of the authority was "excessive and unreasonable". 
His call for a reduction in RSG was approved by a parliamentary major-
ity of 57. 
At this point no-one seemed to know exactly what would happen. 
Th0 scale of the cuts required and the impossibility of the penalty 
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ensured the unity of the Labour Group. The Secretary of State was 
seen as primarily responsible for bringing about the crisis. In addi-
tion the fact that Mr Younger had reduced the penalty from £53 million 
to £47 million after the Representations, seemed to demonstrate the 
value of resistance. On July 23, The Scotsman called for a compromise, 
suggesting the impossibility of the Council's position both legally 
and financially but noting they had made the political points. 
Mr Younger's concern was illustrated by the time that elapsed, 
between receiving Parliamentary approval, and after an extension of 
deadlines, the implementation of the order. It was during this period 
on August 6th that a significant political shift occurred. Mr Rifkind, 
the Scottish Under Secretary, spelt out the terms to be met by the 
final deadline of August 12th: 
"The Council could avoid direct Government action by 
deciding to return £30 million to the ratepayers; or 
they can get up to £17 million of the £47 million cut 
in grant returned by adjusting their budget; or they 
can continue to make savings in which case they would 
lose the entire £47 million by the end of the financial 
year". 
He argued that during the protracted discussions the Secretary of 
State had been reasonable, moving from his original demand, but added: 
"The Councillors should appreciate that the question 
is no longer concerned with the scale of cuts required. 
The issue to be resolved is whether the money is to go 
back to the ratepayer or whether they insist on giving 
it back to the Government. Once Government action has 
been taken the option of returning the money to the 
ratepayers disappears". 
Mr Rifkind had clearly sidestepped the questions of principle - local 
democracy and the local determination of service priorities - and re-
invoked the popular antipathy toward rate levels, further demonstrat-
ing the political cutting edge of the legislation and when the council 
refused to meet his terms on August 11th the political trap was sprung. 
Mr Rifkind commented that the council's refusal to meet his terms "su-
ggests a degree of irrationality I have not previously come across". 
After the Secretary of State had implemented his order to reduce 
RSG by £1.4 million per week, the Labour Group lost political credi-
bility in a spectacular way. On August 13th the unity of the Labour 
Group broke and during a council meeting "administratively possible" 
cuts of £15.2 million were made line by line. Seven of the twenty-
five members voting for no cuts. The Conservative opposition had 
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previously left the chamber. The Scotsman reported a general bewilder-
ment amongst the Labour Group at the enforced destruction of what they 
saw as their budget and level of services they were elected to pro-
vide. (
7
) It was privately' admitted that "they were in a hell of a 
mess". At the same meeting the Labour Group also accepted an immed-
iate moratorium on new expenditure, including a freeze on filling all 
staff vacancies to prevent the council "slipping into illegality". 
The political outcome of this decision was to cost the council dear. 
The Education year was about to begin and the moratorium prohibited 
the renewal of contracts for 480 teachers on fixed term contract and 
for 400 Further Education lecturers. Councillor Mrs Herriot commented 
"I don't think anybody realised how many fixed term contracts there 
were". And in The Scotsman of 170 8.81, Councillor Mulvey said: "there 
is a problem as people didn't know what they were voting for". On 
September 1st the Council increased their total of economies to £23.9 
million and lifted the spending moritorium. During the confusion the 
Group lost political credibility and some friends. Political clumsi-
ness in contrast to their previous principled approach restored the 
political iniative to the Scottish Secretary. On September 3rd he 
said their economies still fell short of his target and that there 
would be no concessions. In addition a public debate between the Re-
gional Party and the Group about the question of resignation further 
detracted attention from the issues. But even when the Scottish Ex-
ecutive of the Labour Party had declared that resignation: "would not 
be in the best interests of the workforce or of the Trade Union move-
ment as a whole", Mr Rifkind believed the council's will was broken 
and moved towards an absolute conclusion of the affair. 
On September 18th the Council was told that their economies 
were still insufficient. 
Mr Rifkind in the Scotsman of 19th September, stated that he be-
lieved that charges wouldn't cause hardship and that reductions could 
be achieved without compulsory redundancies. The Convener of the Region, 
Councillor Crighton retorted 
"We are very angry about this because the Minister 
and Mr Younger have said time and time again 
that in no way did they want to interfere in the 
detailed budget of the authority. This is what they 
are now doing, as the Minister made it clear he will 
not be satisfied unless we get into the area of 
charges for council services".(8) 
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and 
"I was astonished to discover the Minister telling 
the Council to increase •bus fares and cut specific 
services". (9 ) 
By the 18th of September all opportunities for discussion had been ex-
hausted and on the 23rd the Council implemented the full economies of 
£30m. 
In the aftermath of political rhetoric and brinkmanship politics, 
the significance of Mr Rifkind's "absolute conclusion" might be over-
looked. Mr Rifkind's interference was clear and direct when the poli-
tical strength of the Council had been snapped. The Scottish Secretary 
now has powers to put local authority services at risk. The argument 
must now turn from the "Lothian affair" to the implications for centre-
local relations in Scotland. 
II 
The Lothian affair reflects the changed relationship between cen-
ral and local government in Scotland brought about by hasty legisla-
tion. The point at issue is the understanding of this change. If the 
distinctive contribution of local government in determining local ser-
vice provision is questioned , then its political relevance will also 
be challenged. This is increasingly likely, because the affair was the 
result of a legislative initiative introduced without due considera-
tion of the considerable political and constitutional issues. 
Although the local government system has always contained con-
tradictions, local government has often been compliant, respecting 
central government's ultimate control of national economic policy. 
This compliance was bought at the price of local authorities being 
able to identify and articulate local needs and priorities and to 
press central government to take account of them. Now a confrontation 
has developed, central government has become increasingly oblivious 
to this lobby and conveniently ignores the issues. As OOSLA have stated: 
"It must be stressed that despite the way in which the 
glare of publicity has settled upon a few local auth-
orities, it cannot be validly argued 'that all the 
Government's problems stem from a few councils trying 
to embarrass it for political reasons. It is not just 
a few councils which have breached guidelines but the 
vast majority .••.•.••. This demonstrates that there must 
be deep seated problems with both individual guide-
lines and more importantly the aggregate level of re-
levant expenditure when almost the whole of Scottish U 
local government is at odds with the Secretary of State" O) 
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Rather than examining the cause of these problems and the nature of 
demands placed upon local government, the response from central gov-
ernment has been the introduction and implementation of extremely 
tight centralist legislation. 
Such a change has made the political failure of Lothian's stand 
more significant because the principles of centre-local relations have 
been seen to be easily removed from the political agenda. Some calls 
are made for the repeal of the legislation and for a thorough review 
of the rating system but the wider significance of the dispute is as 
a contribution to discussion of the yet unresolved problem of financ-
ing local government activities. As David Heald said: 
"The Conservative Government was elected on a plat-
form of rolling back the public sector and that in-
evitably means fewer resources for local authorities. 
But the issue that has subsequently emerged is that 
any wharp withdrawal of central government resources 
from local authQrities has clear constitutional im-
plications".(llJ 
For these reasons the Lothian solution hasn't been extended to England 
and Wales. The remainder of the paper argues that the affair may in-
dicate the parameters of central government intervention without a 
major change in the constitutional understanding of the role of local 
government. 
There are perhaps two sets of questions that can be directed to-
wards the outcome of the dispute: constitutional and analytical. 
Adopting a •constitutional' approach raises three major ques-
tions. First, how far did the dispute successfully highlight the 
government's attempt to directly reduce local spending? Second, did 
the dispute bring about greater public awareness of the problems of 
the relationship between central and local government? Third, by seek-
ing to raise the level of public debate, how far did the dispute de-
fend the rights of local government which have been seriously under-
mined by successive governments over a number of years? 
Such questions suggest that local government is more political 
with greater involvement by all political parties concerned with de-
veloping active political participation. In contrast the electorate 
displays antipathy towards local government except perhaps during the 
circulation of the annual rate demand. Also the electorate has limited 
interest in service provision except when issues are close and sensi-
tive, such as education or planning. So perhaps the local electorate 
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c~re even less about centre-local relations. Such a position gives 
potential for misrepresentation as was demonstrated during the Lothian 
dispute, for misrepresentation of issues occurred at many levels. 
A more 'analytical' approach however, would argue that centre-
local relations are not simply the product of a constitutional part-
nership of~power-dependence)", but a much more complex process in-
fluenced by changes in economic strategy and policy. Such an approach 
raises a different set of issues. How far have national economic pri-
orities led to centralism? How far have local policy programmes be-
come much more subservient to these priorities rather than local in-
itiatives? How far do such changes run contrary to the characteris-
tics of the new authorities? Since reorganisation authorities are 
much larger and more political, but also designed for exapansion and 
innovation along locally determined lines, something clearly demonstr-
ated by Lothian in areas of social policy. 
These analytical questions therefore reflect the political ten-
sions inherent in the dispute. During the period of the present Con-
servative administration, the provision of local authority services 
can only be described as tense. The political appeal of cutting out 
the local authority level is that it deflects attention away from re-
mote central government. Voters are much more likely to blame the 
council for a deterioration in local services, or for big rate increas-
es, rather than blame central government. Extravagance and ineffic-
iency recur in the rhetoric of political statements. High spending 
and waste have become synonymous. There is little explanation or de-
fence of local authorities and there is little attempt to make them 
more accountable or acceptable. COSLA has argued that it has: 
"serious doubts about the :future because recent 
events have left local authorities, the providers 
of essential local services, with critical finan-
cial problems and faced them with great uncertain-
ties about the decisions which they can independently 
take". ( 12 ) 
A clear demonstration o:f these analytical questions from the Lothian 
dispute is the emergent critical attitude to service provision, from 
the Scottish office. As the Lothian dispute demonstrates, at a time of 
public sector financial stringency it is alleged that local authorities 
are overspending.New and powerful controls have therefore been intro-
duced by national government in order to stop this 'profligacy',emphas~-
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ing the importance of central government as a source of income for all 
local authorities and the significance of this for the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement. Little reference is made as to why central gov-
ernment is involved in financing local authority services and to the 
political significance of this involvement. Commenting on the Lothian 
affair, Donald McKay has said: 
"there is considerable confusion as to the responsi-
bility for service provision and that the existing 
system of local taxation, the rates, is inequitable and 
unfair to the ratepayer." ( 13) 
The very complexity of the problem means that the problem cannot 
be simply reduced to attacks on 'profligacy' and •waste'. The attack 
is also directed towards the extent and range of services themselves. 
The expansion of services has been a major feature of local government 
in the 1960s and 70s. Commenting on reorganisation, Bleddyn Davies 
stressed 
and 
"the apologists for local autonomy have consistently 
underestimated the degree to which the public is in-
terested in service standards and have over estimated 
interest in local government and democracy.n(14) 
"the service politics of the 1960s and 70s would have 
inevitably created increased pressure for central gov-
ernment interference, irrespective of the degree of 
local accountability of the system of finance".(lS) 
Central government therefore had previously legitimated local social 
policy expansion in both financial and organisational terms. Now it 
is faced with the problem of legitimating the restriction of policy 
and services through institutions and procedures designed for expan-
sion and reflecting the assumptions of the service politics of 1960s 
and 70s. 
Such views suggest that the reluctance to reform local government 
finance is related to the enormity of financial problems ~of the 
political interest in service provision, a theme throughout the~ 
resentations presented by Lothian Regional Council. Since the end of 
the Second World War central government has accepted a major role in 
the management of the national economy and linked to this their role 
of provider of the services of the Welfare State. Many social ser-
vices are provided by local authorities and it is often overlooked 
that central government requires the cooperation of local authorities 
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in the administration of services, particularly in aspects of policy 
innovation and implementation. Local Government reorganisation was 
introduced partly to improve these inter-governmental relations, em-
phasising as Wheatley stressed the following advantages of secure 
local government - power, effectiveness, local democracy and local 
involvement. The Lothian dispute clearly demonstrates that when the 
economy is declining, localism is a contingent rather than absolute 
value, and undermines the extent to which local government services 
are to remain devolved. Local expenditure and the determination of 
local service priorities are perhaps questions to be decided in re-
lation to broader changes in the political process and policy priori-
ties. As Professor Bryan Keith-Lucas has argued: 
"Perhaps this ideal of local democratic self-government 
is a will o' the wisp. Perhaps we should recognise that 
it is a romantic dream and look instead to local gov-
ernment solely as a reasonably efficient means of runn-
ing schools, digging drains and providing some social 
services according to government policy".(l6) 
To analysists of local government, the stand taken by Lothian Re-
gional Council is arguably more important than the political outcome. 
The challenge faced by local government and Lothian Region in particu-
lar can no longer be accommodated through simple posturing. Relations 
between central and local government in Scotland are changing. It app-
ears that the radical potential for administration and service deliv-
ery, envisaged at reorganisation, is being ignored. As an editorial 
in New Society commented: 
"local government is now a component of a declin-
ing, but increasingly centralised welfare state 
machine in which the debate on local autonomy 
appears mainly rhetorical". {19 November 1981). 
III 
Conclusion 
With the introduction of the Local Government and Planning (Scot-
land) Act 1982, Mr Younger has added powers which establish the tight-
est supervision of local authority finances. The Scottish Office will 
now calculate how much each council will spend to conform with Gov-
ernment economic policy. As The Scotsman commented (27th November, 
1981): 
"It is a pity that a Bill which embodies the Stodart 
proposals for improving local government should also 
contain "excessive and unreasonable" powers for 
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virtually depriving councils of their already 
meagre financial autonomy". 
The 1982 legislation would enable him in future to force a council 
to reduce their rates and reimburse their ratepayer, or to effect a 
combination of grant and rate reduction. Democracy and the character 
of service provision are again being ignored. As COSLA has commented: 
"Neither constitutional principle, nor a recognition 
of practical realities sye~s to have informed the 
development of policy".( 7 1 
The legislation allowing the Scottish Secretary to determine rate 
levels will inevitably mean that central government has a significant 
influence on local services. Furthermore, one might speculate whether 
the political control of the social policies of local government, 
through various centralist measures, is an attempt to depoliticize 
local government without further administrative upheaval and consti-
tutional enquiry. Hiding behind the myths and fallacies about local 
government, centre-local relations in Scotland are becoming more 
dominated by the centre, raising further questions about the standard 
and delivery of social policies. 
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